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THE PHENOMENON OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN THE SOCIAL 
EXISTENCE OF HUMAN 
Purpose. The research is aimed at determining the influence of negative ethical emotions on social life and the 
activity of the individual, which involves solving the following problems: a) to find out approaches to the typology 
of ethical emotions, b) to highlight individual negative ethical emotions and to determine their ability to influence 
human behaviour. Theoretical basis. The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is the recognition of 
the significant influence of negative emotions on human activity in society. In this regard, it is proposed to consider 
them as a complex multidisciplinary phenomenon, which is predetermined by both social and personal factors of 
origin and has a certain specificity of objectification. Originality. The authors determined that in addition to de-
structive effects on a person of negative emotions, they can also have a constructive effect on person’s behaviour, 
due primarily to the fact that a person does not want to experience these emotions and therefore tries to avoid situa-
tions they cause. Conclusions. The ethical emotions of guilt, embarrassment, anger, disgust and contempt can af-
fect, through the cognitive aspect of the emotional process, the decision-making process of people when they predict 
situations in which they risk to feel such emotions. So the emotion of guilt creates a constructive setup aimed at cor-
recting inappropriate social norms of human behaviour. The emotion of embarrassment motivates a person to be-
have more benevolently in society in order to integrate in it and get its approval, thus encouraging the person to ad-
here to social and moral agreements and norms. The emotion of anger motivates a person to act to eliminate injus-
tice, herewith not only in relation to himself, but also in relation to others. Rejecting those people who cause moral 
and social aversion, society creates a system of punishments and rewards that acts as a strong deterrent to the socio-
cultural behaviour. The emotion of contempt performs the function of preventing punishment in relation to the des-
pised individual. 
Keywords: phenomenon; human; emotion; feelings; anthropology; morality; behaviour 
Introduction 
The research topic is extremely relevant and represents a multidisciplinary interest. Ethical 
emotions are closely related to the social being of the individual, interaction within society, be-
haviour, as well as the relationship between the general and the individual in social action. The 
fulfilment of social norms and rules by human implies their mental and psychological inclusion 
in social life in relation to which they experience many different emotions, as well as are active 
actors in the social activities in which these emotions manifest themselves. 
The impact of emotions on social interactions was considered already by A. Smith 1759. 
Many philosophical works raised the questions of the general cultural significance of emotions, 
anthropology of morality, cognitive aspects of emotions, ethical experiences in morality and law 
(Petrazycki, 1907; Levy, 1984; Bgazhnokov, 2009; Pavlova, 2013; V. Khmil, & T. Khmil, 
2015). Some researchers drew attention to the influence of emotions on the mood and behaviour 
of a person, considering not only the internal, but also the external side thereof (Niedenthal, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006; Frijda, 2001; Vélez, & Ostrosky-Solís, 2006). They also considered 
the decisive role of emotions in making decisions in comparison with rational, logically 
weighted motives. 
Many authors believe that emotional factors affect financial decisions from the standpoint of 
the social and economic security of the society (Benartzi, & Thaler, 2013; Gintis, 2014; Gjerstad, 
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& Smith, 2014; Khmarskyi, & Pavlov, 2017). The typology of ethical emotions was considered 
by Haidt (2003), who drew attention to the possibility of dividing ethical emotions into emotions 
with negative and positive valence, as well as singled out self-conscious emotions and emotions 
associated with evaluating other individuals. This allows moral emotions with negative valence 
to be seen as punishment mechanisms, while those with positive ones as reward mechanisms. 
Many scientists tried to reveal the specifics of such emotions as guilt, embarrassment, anger, dis-
gust and the peculiarities of their manifestation (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall,  
& Gramzow, 1996; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). 
Purpose 
In view of the foregoing, the purpose of the article is to determine the influence of negative 
ethical emotions on social life and the activity of the individual, which involves solving the fol-
lowing problems: a) to find out approaches to the typology of ethical emotions; b) to highlight 
individual negative ethical emotions and to determine their ability to influence human behaviour. 
Statement of basic material 
In the humanities that deal with the problems of emotions, there are many of their definitions, 
comparing which one can reveal various aspects of this phenomenon. According to P. Niedenthal, 
S. Krauth-Gruber, and F. Ric (2006), emotions are not only an internal phenomenon, they mani-
fest themselves as a certain behaviour. Frijda (2001) believes that emotions belong to the catego-
ry of affect, which covers, in particular, emotions and moods. In its turn, the mood is defined as  
a diffuse affective state of low intensity, which is not necessarily the result of some easily recog-
nizable cause. Duration of mood can persist for a period of several minutes to several weeks. The 
mood is felt explicitly, whereas its appearance or termination is not necessarily perceived sepa-
rately. Unlike mood, emotions are more intense, less durable and, as a rule, have  
a very definite cause (Frijda, 2001). Emotions can appear with regard to the situations related to 
our interests. 
Of particular interest from the point of view of philosophical research are moral emotions. 
They are the basis of the ethical or unethical behaviour of the individual in society. Haidt (2003) 
defines moral emotions as those that are closely related to the interests and welfare of society as  
a whole or, at least, to the well-being of the other person (with the exception of the individual who 
feels these kinds of emotions). Consequently, moral emotions are caused by social situations, con-
nected not only with the individual personal being of a human, but also with the interaction with 
other people. 
Moral emotions can appear when people interact with each other or arise when a person expe-
riences a violation of moral standards. Interest in the study of such emotions is growing within 
various sciences. Especially relevant is their socio-philosophical and anthropological research. 
The philosophical approach to moral emotions broadens the scope of their understanding, inclu-
ding this phenomenon in the general cultural context, and is not limited to their consideration 
only as an individual phenomenon. Thus, considering the concept of anthropology of morality, 
Bgazhnokov (2009) defines it as "the reality of moral life, the moral state of a person and socie-
ty, given in experience" (p. 15). According to Levy (1984), moral emotions should be the subject 
of philosophical research, as they relate to the sphere of cognition. 
The problem of ethical emotions is also considered in economic science, in particular, it is 
relevant in the behavioural economy, for example, in the decision-making of economic agents, as 
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was also mentioned by A. Smith in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Smith, & Haakonssen, 
2002). Of course, psychologists are also involved in this problem; some of them suggested that 
in some social interactions our behaviour depends, to the greater extent, on the moral emotions 
than on logical thinking or cognitive abilities (Vélez, & Ostrosky-Solís, 2006). 
A prominent representative of the psychological law school L. Petrazycki made a great con-
tribution to the study of ethical emotions. Particularly interesting are his views on the problem of 
their influence on human behaviour in society. According to Petrazycki (1907), the essential sig-
nificance of ethical experiences of the moral and legal types is manifested in the fact that they  
1) act as motives for behaviour, encourage one to carry out certain actions and to refrain from 
performing other ones; 2) create certain changes in the very dispositive psyche of individuals and 
masses, develop and strengthen certain habits and inclinations, weaken and eradicate other ones. 
Moral emotions have common characteristics. An important moment in determining the cha-
racteristics of moral emotions and their differentiated impact on the social behaviour of a person 
is their division into 2 types: 1) those characterized by negative valence; 2) those promoting wel-
fare and benefit. For a more detailed analysis of ethical emotions, one must turn to their classifi-
cation. The moral emotions include shame, guilt, embarrassment, anger, contempt and disgust 
(emotions with negative valence), as well as generosity, gratitude and admiration (emotions with 
positive valence), etc. 
Haidt (2003) offers the typology of moral emotions that includes self-conscious emotions, as 
well as emotions associated with evaluating other people and empathy. Self-conscious emotions 
include shame, embarrassment, guilt and generosity. What they have in common is that they are 
caused by interpersonal events (negative or positive), the cause of which is attributed to the per-
son himself. For example, it is entirely possible that he will experience an emotion of guilt or 
shame after opportunistic behaviour associated with the use of the fruits of collective efforts. 
Conversely, a person can experience the emotion of generosity by making serious investments in 
the implementation of a collective project. According to Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek 
(2007), these kinds of emotions are caused by self-esteem and reflection. They are valuable indi-
cators for assessing how we are perceived in our social environment, and thus help to maintain 
good relations with other people. In particular, they inform us about the social or moral accepta-
bility of our behaviour, acting as an emotional punishment or reward. As noted by J. Tangney,  
J. Stuewig, and D. Mashek (2007), these assessing emotions function as a "moral emotional ba-
rometer". When an individual commits a crime or makes a mistake that harms others, he can ex-
perience such emotions as guilt, shame or embarrassment, which can lead not only to personal 
troubles, but also to social, in particular economic losses. Conversely, when a person's behaviour 
corresponds to social and moral norms, positive emotions of generosity or self-approval can lead 
to a positive personal and social result, which fully compensates for socially directed behaviour. 
Self-conscious moral emotions have the most important social significance in people's lives; 
this is due, first of all, to the person’s need to belong to a group, community and society as  
a whole. These emotions, according to Haidt (2003), are designed to successfully adapt people to 
life within the community by excluding behaviour that may cause others to feel such emotions as 
contempt, anger or disgust, or to promote social and moral behaviour evoking in others such 
emotions as admiration or gratitude. 
It is these emotions, according to Haidt (2003), that refer to the second group of moral emo-
tions, i.e. emotions associated with evaluating others. In their consideration, the object of evalua-
tion is no longer the person himself, but a focus is on the behaviour of his environment. As in the 
case of self-conscious emotions, within the second group of moral emotions, emotions are dis-
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tinguished as with negative valence, which Haidt (2003) calls other-condemning emotions (in-
cluding emotions of anger/indignation, contempt and disgust), and emotions with positive va-
lence, for example, praising emotions, in particular, emotions of gratitude and admiration. 
The other-condemning emotions as anger, indignation, disgust and contempt are moral emo-
tions on the same grounds as emotions that encourage social behaviour, as they represent the 
most important mechanisms for regulating interpersonal relations and maintaining public order. 
These emotions can lead to revenge, boycott or insults with respect to the object of evaluation, 
that is, a person or a group of people who violated moral norms. Consequently, such moral emo-
tions encourage the adoption and use of coercive measures by people who experience such emo-
tions towards such a person or group of people because of their antisocial or morally unacceptable 
behaviour. In particular, this can lead, through expectation, foreseeing of coercive measures, to 
suppression of a person's desire to carry out such behaviour. 
The praising emotions arise when the people around us behave "excellently" or perform ac-
tions aimed at increasing our personal welfare or the prosperity of society as a whole. The other-
condemning emotions imply a negative reciprocity on the part of persons experiencing this kind 
of emotion towards the people who are the source of these emotions, while the other-praising 
emotions may be the cause of positive reciprocity that encourages social behaviour. According to 
Haidt (2003), the positive emotions in question can stimulate members of society to create social 
bonds and become better and better, and also openly show a desire to help others. The other-
praising emotions can enhance social behaviour both of those who evoke this kind of emotion in 
other people, and those who experience these positive emotions. 
Within the framework of these two groups of moral emotions, one can conduct regrouping by 
valence in order to represent different emotions and their characteristics. This is due to the fact 
that moral emotions with negative valence can be punitive mechanisms that are oriented toward 
themselves or to other individuals with respect to inappropriate moral or social behaviour. In 
turn, emotions with positive valence are the basis of remuneration mechanisms that are also 
oriented toward themselves or to others in connection with social behaviour and actions. 
In the scientific literature, there are no clear boundaries between self-conscious emotions with 
negative valence. Haidt (2003) noted that in some non-Western cultures, for example Asian, 
there are no lexical differences between the emotions of shame and embarrassment, the guilt 
emotion does not stand out separately, but is more or less integrated into the emotion of shame or 
embarrassment. However, nevertheless between such different emotions there are subtle differ-
rences and they should be considered. 
Shame and guilt are emotions that emerge when a person commits an action that violates so-
cial or moral norms. Nevertheless, the guilt emotion is more appropriate in the context of viola-
tion of moral norms, when other people are harmed. Tangney et al. (1996) indicate that when 
describing situations in which the shame emotion is experienced, subjects express greater con-
cern about the other's opinion relative to themselves compared with the guilt emotion, but when 
describing the cases when the guilt emotion is experienced, the subjects are more concerned 
about the potential impact through their behaviour on others. Thus, the intervention of egocen-
trism in the experience of the shame emotion forces the subject to believe that it is more mea-
ningful than the guilt emotion when there is a public violation of moral norms, because it directly 
depends on the opinions and judgments of others. 
The clearest difference between the emotion of shame and the emotion of guilt is at the level 
of the focal difference that arises from the experience of such emotions. In the case of shame, the 
focus of attention is directed toward oneself: "it is ME who did a terrible thing", "what a terrible 
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person I am", whereas in the case of guilt, the accent shifts to actual behaviour: "yet I did this terri-
ble THING", "what a terrible THING I did". According to Haidt (2003), the emotion of shame is 
not a regulator of any behaviour, but rather it indicates who someone should be. Therefore, in to-
day's West European society, shame is a more painful emotion associated with a person's persona-
lity and reduces his self-esteem. Thus, on the scale of valence, the emotion of shame usually has  
a stronger negative intensity than the emotion of guilt, respectively, and the psychological hard-
ships caused by the shame emotion can be stronger than those caused by the guilt emotion. 
Emotions of guilt and shame have very different potentials of action, since guilt refers to 
moral emotions and usually leads to a specific concrete action – helping people in distress, this 
allows not to experience an emotion of guilt towards them, as well as to provide compensation 
for the damage to the affected party, apology or remorse. According to Haidt (2003), this ten-
dency is intended to mitigate or eliminate the negative consequences of the guilt emotion and is 
aimed at restoring relationships that are threatened by inappropriate, unacceptable behaviour. 
J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007) indicate that the emotion of shame generates  
a desire to limit one’s social presence by hiding or escaping. Shame can also be associated with 
an emotion of anger and a strong reaction to revenge in the context of seeking to protect one's 
own dignity or reputation. 
Embarrassment is an emotion very similar to shame. However, self-conscious emotions are 
associated with self-esteem, which is carried out in relation to moral norms and social agree-
ments. According to Haidt (2003), Western society makes some distinctions between problems 
of moral nature, for example, when someone harms another individual by addressing issues of 
justice and law; and the problems of social agreements, for example, what is associated with the 
choice of clothing and food, care for themselves. Thus, the author points out that the emotion of 
embarrassment will be experienced mainly in the context of violations of social conventions, 
while the emotion of shame will be mainly related to violations of moral norms. Haidt (2003) 
also notes that the emotion of embarrassment is experienced in situations in which, to a lesser 
degree, the self-esteem of a person is less endangered than others and is less violent than an emo-
tion of shame. Also, the author connects the emergence of emotion of embarrassment with the 
inconsistency of the social status of people entering into communication. 
According to J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007), embarrassment is an emotion 
somewhat less connected with morality than shame and guilt. Miller (1995) believes that the emo-
tion of embarrassment is defined as an abominable state of humiliation, confusion and sadness af-
ter difficult public situations, when a person behaves awkwardly, absent-mindedly or unsuccessful-
ly. Emotion of embarrassment is associated with situations where, to a lesser extent, the assessment 
of a person in the eyes of others is threatened and causes much less loss than an emotion of shame. 
The other-condemning emotions result from a negative assessment of the behaviour or ac-
tions taken by people around us. These kinds of emotions play a key role in maintaining respect 
for moral and social norms, encouraging the use of punishment mechanisms for example re-
venge, boycott, ridicule, against those who violate these norms. This group of emotions includes 
anger and indignation, as well as disgust and contempt. 
Emotion of anger is the primary emotion inherent in all people in all cultures of the world. It 
is inherent in both humans and other living beings, such as rats and dogs, and is felt during frus-
tration. In humans, anger can also occur in other cases, such as insult, dissatisfaction, anxiety, 
physical or psychological pain. According to A. Ortony, G. Clore and A. Collins (1988), the 
emotion of anger is experienced, in particular, when a person faces emotional distress especially 
if the latter is perceived as unfair, and it can be both actual and potential, and responsibility and 
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intent are associated with the offender. The influence of emotion of anger can be found in many 
social situations; in particular, it can be experienced during the process of exchange between 
several partners, when one of them makes an unjust proposal in the opinion of the other party. It 
is possible that after the appearance of such an emotion, the main tendencies to action in an indi-
vidual may be revenge and the demand for compensation. For example, in the case of business 
negotiations, one partner may decide to take revenge by rejecting a proposal that he considers 
unfair. Therefore, the emotion of anger is characterized by negative reciprocity in relation to the 
source of the given emotion. According to Haidt (2003), these tendencies may seem selfish and 
antisocial. However, anger has other aspects that endow it with characteristics of moral emotion. 
D. Watts and P. Dodds (2007) indicate that the relationship between anger and morality is in-
vert. Anger reflects the individual's moral susceptibility in the sense that an immoral person is 
certainly not capable of such an emotional reaction. Emotion of anger is also experienced in re-
sponse to an event or behaviour that constitutes a violation of moral standards. The damage, in 
this case, does not need to be done personally to the individual experiencing such an emotion. 
Thus, the emotion of anger helps to increase the level of moral sensitivity in people and leads to 
social behaviour. According to J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007), anger can arise as 
a result of observing unacceptable behaviour directed against a third party. 
Yet the work by Charles Darwin (1872) "On the expression of emotions in humans and ani-
mals" noted that disgust refers to something disgusting, mostly associated with taste perception 
real or imaginary. This is also true for other types of perception, especially visual, tactile, olfac-
tory ones. The definition in question can be extended, on the one hand, by intentions or actions 
related to outrageous use of one's own body, incest, child abuse, sexual deviation, drug abuse, 
and on the other hand, as P. Rozin, J. Haidt and C. McCauley (2008) noted, violations of a pure-
ly social and moral character. 
Unlike anger that suggests a tendency to attack, criticize or revenge, the tendency to act for 
the disgust emotion is directed towards self-defence and consists in avoiding a source of disgust, 
for example, a dish with spoiled food or a person who betrayed confidence. According to Haidt 
(2003), this tendency is particularly useful in terms of human security, since it avoids the con-
sumption of products potentially hazardous to health. 
Emotion of contempt, like anger and disgust, is the result of negative evaluation of others. 
Contempt for any person implies looking down on that person and feeling one’s moral superiori-
ty. According to J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007) contempt refers to the social hie-
rarchy, status. 
This emotion is less connected with the notion of morality than anger or disgust. However, 
the emergence of such an emotion in human is due to ridicule and disrespectful attitude towards 
them. The less despicable are the less developed people or those whose social status is lower or 
they cannot meet high moral standards. If we take as an example the workers of an enterprise, 
then this emotion will motivate some of them to exert maximum efforts in order to reduce the 
likelihood of condemnation and hostility on the part of the employer and colleagues. 
Originality 
The authors determined that in addition to destructive effects on a person of negative emo-
tions, they can also have a constructive effect on person’s behaviour, due primarily to the fact 
that a person does not want to experience these emotions and therefore tries to avoid situations 
they cause. 
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Conclusions 
The influence of ethical emotions on the human social behaviour was determined. We iden-
tified the constructive and destructive attitudes of human social behaviour caused by different 
ethical emotions of negative orientation. If the guilt emotion creates a constructive correction 
attitude, the emotion of shame tends to cause behaviour that seriously damages the conventional 
social relations. Emotion of embarrassment also affects the human social behaviour, it in particu-
lar motivates to friendliness. Emotion of anger, which is sometimes called indignation, has both 
constructive and destructive orientation. Constructive orientation is that it motivates to eliminate 
injustice, while destructive one demonstrates itself when the anger is of high intensity and is of 
massive nature, then its manifestation can lead to negative, destructive consequences for society. 
Disgust can also be the cause of actions aimed at favourable social behaviour. This emotion 
plays a crucial role in supporting respect for moral and social norms, as it contributes to the in-
troduction of punishment mechanisms in relation to those who violate these norms. Those cir-
cumstances that all these emotions are undesirable for a person can be understood as a serious 
deterrent to antisocial behaviour in the long run. The expectation of potential violators of the ap-
pearance of emotions of anger, indignation, disgust, contempt and corresponding tendencies to 
act on the part of other people can convince them not to commit violations, and thus motivate to 
adhere to social desirable behaviour. 
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ФЕНОМЕН ЕМОЦІЙ НЕГАТИВНОЇ СПРЯМОВАНОСТІ В 
СОЦІАЛЬНОМУ БУТТІ ЛЮДИНИ 
Мета. Дослідження спрямоване на визначення впливу негативних етичних емоцій на соціальне життя  
й діяльність особистості, що передбачає розв'язання певних задач: а) з'ясувати підходи до типологізації ети-
чних емоцій, б) виділити окремі негативні етичні емоції і визначити їх здатність впливати на людську пове-
дінку. Теоретичний базис. Теоретико-методологічною базою дослідження є визнання вагомого впливу ети-
чних емоцій негативної направленості на діяльність людини в суспільстві. У зв'язку з цим пропонується їх 
розглянути як складний мультидисциплінарний феномен, що зумовлений як соціальними, так і особистіс-
ними факторами виникнення і має певну специфіку об'єктивації. Наукова новизна. Авторами було визна-
чено, що, окрім деструктивного впливу на людину етичних емоцій негативного характеру, вони можуть та-
кож і конструктивно впливати на її поведінку; пов'язане це перш за все з тим, що людина не бажає пережи-
вати ці емоції і тому намагається уникнути ситуацій, які їх викликають. Висновки. Етичні емоції провини, 
збентеження, гніву, відрази, презирства можуть впливати через когнітивний аспект емоційного процесу на 
процес прийняття рішень людьми, коли вони прогнозують ситуації, в яких ризикують відчути такі емоції. 
Так, емоція провини створює конструктивну установку, що спрямована на виправлення невідповідної суспі-
льним нормам поведінки людини. Емоція збентеження мотивує людину поводитися більш доброзичливо  
в суспільстві з метою інтеграції в нього і схвалення з його боку, таким чином заохочуючи її дотримуватися 
соціальних і моральних угод і норм. Емоція гніву мотивує людину до дії з усунення несправедливості, при 
чому не тільки щодо неї самої, а й по відношенню до інших. Відкидаючи тих людей, що визивають мораль-
ну і соціальну відразу, суспільство створює систему покарань і заохочень, що діють як сильний стримуючий 
фактор для належної в соціально-культурному відношенні поведінки. Емоція презирства виконує функцію 
попередження покарання по відношенню до індивіда, що зневажається. 
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ФЕНОМЕН ЭМОЦИЙ НЕГАТИВНОЙ НАПРАВЛЕННОСТИ В 
СОЦИАЛЬНОМ БЫТИИ ЧЕЛОВЕКА 
Цель. Исследование направлено на определение влияния негативных этических эмоций на социальную 
жизнь и деятельность личности, что предусматривает решение определенных задач: а) выяснить подходы  
к типологизации этических эмоций, б) выделить отдельные негативные этические эмоции и определить их 
способность влиять на человеческое поведение. Теоретический базис. Теоретико-методологической базой 
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исследования является признание весомого влияния этических эмоций негативной направленности на дея-
тельность человека в обществе. В связи с этим предлагается их рассмотреть как сложный мультидисциплинар-
ный феномен, который обусловлен как социальными, так и личностными факторами возникновения и имеет 
определенную специфику объективации. Научная новизна. Авторами было установлено, что, кроме деструк-
тивного воздействия на человека этических эмоций негативного характера, они могут также и конструктивно 
влиять на его поведение; а связано это прежде всего с тем, что человек не желает переживать эти эмоции  
и поэтому старается избегать ситуаций, которые их вызывают. Выводы. Этические эмоции вины, смущения, 
гнева, отвращения, презрения могут влиять через когнитивный аспект эмоционального процесса на процесс 
принятия решений людьми, когда они прогнозируют ситуации, в которых рискуют испытать такие эмоции. 
Так, эмоция вины создает конструктивную установку, которая направлена на исправление несоответствующе-
го общественным нормам поведения человека. Эмоция смущения мотивирует человека вести себя более дру-
желюбно в обществе с целью интеграции в него и одобрения с его стороны, таким образом, поощряя его при-
держиваться социальных и моральных соглашений и норм. Эмоция гнева мотивирует человека к действию по 
устранению несправедливости, причем не только в отношении его самого, но и по отношению к другим. От-
вергая тех людей, которые вызывают моральное и социальное отвращение, общество создает систему наказа-
ний и поощрений, действующих как сильный сдерживающий фактор для надлежащего в социально-
культурном отношении поведения. Эмоция презрения выполняет функцию предупреждения наказания по 
отношению к индивиду, которого презирают. 
Ключевые слова: феномен; человек; эмоция; чувства; антропология; мораль; поведение 
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